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SLAYING THE LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE TREADY OF 
WAITANGI 
K Upston­Hooper * 
This paper considers the perspectives of four contributors to the current discourse on the 
Treaty of Waitangi: Professor Jane Kelsey, Dr Paul McHugh, Professor F M Brookfield and 
Moana Jackson.  The jurisprudential underpinnings of each authors arguments are examined. 
The paper focuses on the degree to which two new forms of jurisprudential thought, Critical Legal 
Studies and Critical Race Theory, have informed the Treaty discourse.  The paper concludes that, 
although such critical jurisprudence has yet to permeate New Zealand jurisprudence in any 
meaningful way,  Critical Race Theory could help transform post­settler legal thinking. This 
paper was awarded the Quentin­Baxter LLM prize in Public and International Law in 1997. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is trite to observe that the Treaty of Waitangi has undergone a renaissance in the 
past decade.  A renaissance in which the nature of identity of all citizens is contested and 
the Treaty has been "constitutionalised". 1 The scope, meaning and effect of this 
"constitutionalisation" has been the subject of an intense and heated discourse which has 
been occasionally unsightly and vicious. 2 At the heart of this debate is a rejection of the 
traditional concept of sovereignty as unitary, indivisible and omnipotent. The envisaging 
of a post­colonial constitutional future is premised on the rejection of the constitutional 
past, the slaying of the Leviathan. 3 
* This is an edited version of a paper submitted as part of the VUW LLM programme. 
1 Havemann "The 'Pakeha Constitutional Revolution?' Five Perspectives on Maori Rights and 
Pakeha Duties" (1993) 1 Waikato L R 53, 77. 
2 McHugh "Legal Reasoning and the Treaty of Waitangi: Orthodox and Radical Approaches" in 
Oddie and Perrett (eds) Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1992) 91, 104. 
3 Hobbes Leviathan, or Matter, Forme & Power of a Common­wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (1651) 
reprinted, Penguin Books, London, 1961).  Hobbes uses Leviathan, the great sea monster from the
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II TREATY DISCOURSE AND JURISPRUDENCE 
A Kelsey 
Professor Jane Kelsey is one of New Zealand's leading contributors 4 to the debate on 
the role and function of the Treaty of Waitangi in our contemporary society. 
The thesis of Kelsey's work is that the New Zealand state has since 1840 faced a 
fundamental contradiction between colonial capitalism and the "rights of the tangata 
whenua to their own political and economic sovereignty". 5 Kelsey argues that this 
fundamental contradiction was finally exposed by the conflict between the fourth Labour 
Government's Treaty policy and its Rogernomics ideals.  She argues that, in response to 
this conflict, the dominant legal ideology, as represented by the courts and the Waitangi 
Tribunal, has temporarily resolved the "fundamental contradiction" in the interests of 
Pakeha capital. 6 This process has accordingly suppressed and redefined Maori claims for 
tino rangatiratanga. Kelsey's thesis is founded on an instrumentalist view of the role of 
law in our society: 7 
Law is hegemonic, and subjects all who come within its scope to a reconstitution of their 
problems in terms which reflect the interests of the State. 
At the heart of Kelsey's writing is an attempt to expose the invisibility of the law that 
leads people to view it as neutral and "somehow above politics and economics, more 
independent and more trustworthy". 8 She deprecates the ideology of legal liberalism. 
This is not liberalism in the form of centre­left political beliefs, but the liberalism, or focus 
on the individual, primarily associated with the writings of John Locke.  At the heart of 
legal liberalism is the view that individuals have rights over themselves and their 
property into which neither the government nor other individuals can intrude.  In legal 
Book of Job, as a metaphor for the unitary and indivisible power of the sovereign: "He has not his 
like among the strong things of the earth, that fearless nature, that heaven­confronting eye over all 
the pride of earth he reigns supreme": Old Testament, Book of Job, Ch 41. 
4 Recognised by the award of a personal chair in law by Auckland University in 1997. 
5 Kelsey A Question of Honour?  Labour and the Treaty 1984­1989 (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1989) 3. 
6 Above n 5, 237. 
7 Kelsey Rolling Back the State:  Privatisation of Power in New Zealand/Aotearoa (Bridget Williams 
Books, Wellington, 1993) 192, quoting prominent neo­Marxist Maureen Cain "The General Practice 
of Lawyer and Client: Towards a Radical Conception" (1979) 3 IJSL 31,333. However, Kelsey notes 
at 191: "It would be wrong to suggest that law automatically reflects the prevailing economic and 
political interests.  The relationship is much more fluid than that.  Law constitutes, and is 
constituted by, the complex interaction of economic, political and social conditions". 
8 Above n 7, 191.
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systems liberalism manifests itself in the form of the rule of law and the adversarial 
nature of legal process. 
Kelsey's vitriolic attack on legal liberalism is focused on the line of judicial decisions 
that began with the 1987 New Zealand Maori Council case 9 and also attacks the findings of 
the Waitangi Tribunal (following the Orakei Report 10 ).  Kelsey argues that the courts and 
the Waitangi Tribunal, in using the interpretive tool of the "principles of the Treaty", have 
essentially rewritten the Treaty so as to deny tino rangatiratanga (as guaranteed by 
Article Two of the Maori version of the Treaty) and have consequently "legitimated and 
entrenched Pakeha political and economic power". 11 
Kelsey conceptualises this redefinition of the Treaty as a Gramscian "passive 
revolution": 12 
The inclusion of new social groups under the hegemony of the political order without any 
expansion of real political control by the mass of the population over politics. 
Kelsey argues that by this process of "passive revolution" Maori have been 
encouraged to see the State as the neutral arbiter of the competing interests of its citizens. 
The concept of "passive revolution" is utilised by Kelsey to dismiss concessions and 
promises of change made by the State as being merely part of a strategy of divide and 
rule until the challenge of tino rangatiratanga to the State's authority is diffused. 
In addition to challenging the role of the judiciary and the Waitangi Tribunal, Kelsey 
also attacks lawyers and academics for their role in the "passive revolution" which has 
resulted in the limiting and redefining of tino rangatiratanga: 13 
Lawyers who are a party to the judicialisation of the Treaty act as the organic intellectuals of 
both capital and Pakeha hegemony whichever "side" they are on. 
She argues that almost all academics speak from a position of not only cultural 
ignorance but also arrogance. 14 Kelsey acknowledges that the challenge for her as a white 
9 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
10 Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei Claim Wai­9 (1987). 
11 Kelsey "Rogernomics and the Treaty: An Irresolvable Contradiction" (1989) 7 Law in Context 66, 
85. 
12 Above n 7, 234 quoting Sassoon Gramsci's Politics (2 ed, Hutchinson, London 1987) 210. 
13 Above n 11, 69. 
14 Above n 5, 263.
686 (1998) 28 VUWLR 
academic is to make the critique of legal liberalism available to Maori. But Kelsey 
cautions that the path to liberation lies in the hands of the oppressed. 15 
Kelsey's conclusion is that the crisis the state faced in the early 1980s, as a result of 
Maori claims to tino rangatiratanga, has been temporarily resolved by the judiciary and 
the Waitangi Tribunal utilising the concept of "principles of the Treaty" to limit and 
redefine Maori claims. She argues that unless tino rangatiratanga is recognised, not as 
dependent or subordinate to the Pakeha state, but as part of a dual state with coexisting 
constitutional entities, then the Pakeha state risks organised and possibly violent 
resistance. 16 We need only to look at Kanaki, Bougainville and Fiji to understand the 
long term consequences if the issue of self­determination is not grappled with soon.  A 
country ruled by violence and repression is not desired by anyone. 17 
The jurisprudence of Kelsey has been described as belonging to, and being strongly 
influenced by, the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") movement. 18 The tenets and critique of 
CLS will be examined in depth in Part III of this paper. It is necessary, however, to briefly 
background CLS in order to provide perspective to Kelsey's critical jurisprudence and 
associated orthodox response. 
The CLS movement is essentially a "left political location". 19 It is a form of critical 
jurisprudence that utilises the tools of deconstruction to attempt to demystify legal 
liberalism, exposing the law as inherently indeterminate.  CLS adherents hold that there 
is no interesting difference between legal discourse and ordinary moral and political 
discourse. 20 
The origins of CLS are eclectic, and to some extent amorphous. It is indebted to the 
deconstruction tools of legal realism and the critical concepts derived from the 
continental philosophy of Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, Jean­Paul Sartre and 
Jurgen Habermas. This group forms the nucleus of critical Marxist jurisprudence. 
15 Above n 11, 71. 
16 Above n 7, 363: "The danger to the state and capital lies in organised ­ not necessarily violent ­ 
Maori resistance" [emphasis added]. 
17 Kelsey "The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Independence ­ Future Directions" (1990) 9th 
Commonwealth Law Conference papers, 249, at 254. 
18 Brookfield "Maori Rights and Two Radical Writers: Review and Response" [1990] NZLJ 406, 407 
and McHugh "Legal Reasoning and the Treaty of Waitangi: Orthodox and Radical Approaches" in 
Oddie and Perrett (ed) Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1992) 91, 99. 
19 Tushnet "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History" (1991) 100 Yale L J 1515, 1515. 
20 Above n 19, 1524.
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Critical Marxism is distinguishable from its scientific Marxist antecedent by its rejection 
of the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and its abandonment of economic 
determinism. 21 The central tenet of critical Marxism is a focus on ideas as a source of 
social change.  There is a focus on consciousness and culture; on how people come to 
give meaning to their social world; on how they come to absorb ideologies that interpret 
the world in the interests of the dominant groups. 22 Critical Marxism seeks to empower 
the oppressed, to alter their consciousness so as to enable them to free themselves from 
the unjust status quo. 
The primary contribution of critical Marxism to CLS jurisprudence is the concepts of 
ideology and hegemony: 23 
Ideology and hegemony are concepts used to explain how such groups manage to maintain a 
superior position over a larger mass of people without the constant use of force or the threat of 
force.  An ideology is a way of understanding and interpreting the world that reflects the 
interests and biases of a particular group, but which presents itself as neutral and unbiased. 
The dominant group's ideology will explain and justify that group's privileged position by 
means of notions such as natural order ordained by a deity, or flowing from the nature of man, 
or produced by the invisible hand of the marketplace.  Hegemony is achieved when members 
of subordinate groups internalise to a significant extent the ideology of the dominant group 
and so accept the legitimacy of the status quo.  Many important features of society then come to 
seem fixed or unalterable.  Alternatives to them are difficult even to conceive. 
The jurisprudence of Kelsey relies heavily on the concepts of ideology and hegemony 
to explain the "passive revolution" of how apparent the judicial victories of Maori in the 
last decade actually served to legitimate the interests of the state and the privileged few 
Pakeha who benefit from capitalism. 
However, to categorise Kelsey as a CLS scholar is overly simplistic and collapses all 
critical jurisprudence into a convenient (and pejorative) label that becomes so wide as to 
lack meaning. The jurisprudence of Kelsey is that of critical Marxism, as evidenced by her 
intellectual reliance on Antonio Gramsci and her constant polemic directed against 
capitalism. The fact that CLS scholars have eclectically borrowed the critical Marxist 
concepts of ideology and hegemony should not result in a categorisation of Kelsey as a 
CLS scholar. Any such categorisation would be premised on the false assumption that the 
"Left" is a homogenous and unified intellectual location. 
21 For a fuller discussion of the development of Marxist jurisprudence see Robertson "Critical Legal 
Studies and Socialism" (1991) 14 NZULR 355. 
22 Above n 21, 363. 
23 Above n 21, 362.
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In fact, the vast array of Kelsey's writing contains only one reference to a CLS 
scholar. 24 Futhermore, Kelsey's analysis of the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal is 
essentially orthodox academic doctrinal analysis.  Unlike CLS scholars, such as 
Kennedy, 25 Kelman 26 and Klare, 27 Kelsey does not seek to penetrate the surface of social 
reality and expose the effect of law on the actual workings of society.  Her work, in 
contrast to that of CLS scholars, is bereft of an analysis of the effect of the Treaty 
decisions on the "Grace Hekes" 28 of New Zealand. Despite her self­proclaimed challenge 
of making the critique of legal liberalism accessible to Maori, Kelsey makes no attempt to 
utilise a creative narrative methodology in order to aid in the communication of her 
thesis. 
In addition, as discussed in Part III, CLS contains a damning critique of the legal 
liberal conception of rights.  This critique of the "myth of rights" is absent from Kelsey's 
thesis, although she does acknowledge that: 29 
[The] Western definition of indigenous rights merely maintains the authority and power of 
those who do the defining.  It in effect says that tangata whenua possess those individual rights 
which recognise that they are born free and equal in dignity, but they do not possess the 
collective right to self­determination which recognised that they are free and equal in sovereign 
power. 
However, Kelsey is not attacking rights as being "passivising illusions" 30 but merely 
arguing for collective rather than individual rights.  Kelsey's rights stance further 
distances her jurisprudence from CLS. 
In summary, Kelsey's work attempts to prove that legal liberalism is structurally 
incapable of providing justice to Maori in terms of tino rangatiratanga. 31 What tino 
rangatiratanga actually means in the late twentieth century is largely ignored by Kelsey. 
24 Klare "Judicial Deradicalisation of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness 
1937­1941" in Bierne and Quinney (eds) Marxism and the Law (Wiley, Canada, 1982). 
25 Kennedy "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harvard L Rev 1685. 
26 Kelman  "Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law (1981) 33 Stanford L Rev 591. 
27 Klare "The Post­War Paradigm in American Labor Law" (1981) 90 Yale L J 1509. 
28 The tragic lead character in Duff Once Were Warriors (Tandem Press, Auckland, 1990). 
29 Above n 17, 254. 
30 Gabel and Kennedy "Roll over Beethoven" (1984) 36 Stanford L Rev 1, 33. 
31 Above n 11, 70.
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She notes it is absolute control and authority over all precious tangible and intangible 
things 32 but does not convert this abstraction into a politically recognisable reality. 
It is submitted that the jurisprudence of Kelsey's "passive revolution" is derived 
directly from critical Marxism rather than second hand from CLS.  Although there is an 
overlap due to the eclectic borrowing of CLS from critical Marxism, the orthodox 
categorisation of Kelsey as a CLS scholar ignores the details of her writing and collapses 
too many concepts under the convenient tag of CLS. 
B McHugh 
The other primary contributor to New Zealand's Treaty discourse is Dr Paul McHugh. 
McHugh has described himself as writing in the orthodox legal paradigm. 33 This 
paradigm is defined by its adherence to the traditional concepts of the rule of law, the 
utility of the common law and unitary Parliamentary sovereignty.  The writings of 
Professor Brookfield, which are considered in Part II D, also fall squarely within this 
paradigm. 
Much of McHugh's early contribution to Treaty discourse focused on the rediscovery 
and application of aboriginal rights in the common law. 34 This theme of his work has 
been gradually replaced by a focus on the indigenisation of constitutional discourse in 
New Zealand, and particularly the role of both law and history in this discourse. 35 
McHugh argues that the Treaty decisions have transformed New Zealand's constitutional 
discourse, forcing the Crown to listen to and negotiate with Maori.  According to 
McHugh, this process of "horizontalisation" of the power relationship between Crown 
and Maori is part of a move towards the adoption of a form of constitution which 
recognises cultural diversity: 36 
A constitution should be seen as a form of activity, an intercultural dialogue in which the 
culturally diverse sovereign citizens of contemporary societies negotiate agreements on their 
forms of association over time in accordance with the three conventions of mutual recognition, 
consent and cultural continuity. 
32 Above n 11, 71. 
33 Above n 2, 91. 
34 McHugh "The Legal Basis for Maori Claims Against the Crown" (1988) 18 VUWLR 1; McHugh 
"The Role of Law in Maori Claims" [1990] NZLJ 16. 
35 McHugh "Constitutional Voices" (1996) 26 VUWLR 499. 
36 Above n 35, 506: Quoting Tully Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) 30.
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McHugh notes that, like the House of Lords in the Factortame case, 37 the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal has sidestepped the issue of parliamentary sovereignty posed 
by orthodox constitutionalism when determining Treaty litigation. 38 He suggests that 
sovereignty is kept out of the picture by the Court of Appeal as it is unhelpful and 
unsuited to the pragmatic nature of the Court's decisions.  McHugh's writing focuses on 
how the indigenisation of constitutional discourse provides an alternative to the concept 
of unitary parliamentary sovereignty which has previously dominated constitutional 
thought. McHugh has essentially resiled from his earlier position 39 that Leviathan 40 
(unitary and indivisible sovereignty) was compatible with tino rangatiratanga under the 
orthodox legal paradigm.  McHugh now acknowledges: 41 
Rangatiratanga and sovereignty: square peg in round hole. 
Essentially, McHugh has departed from a strict orthodox legal paradigm and now 
rejects that a grundnorm based on Leviathan is able to represent the nature of 
constitutional entity that is New Zealand.  McHugh argues that this traditional 
constitutionalism should be replaced by a contemporary constitutionalism which is 
"dialogic and aspectival". 42 Such contemporary constitutionalism would reject 
Leviathan's "empire of uniformity" and focus on recognising and affirming difference 
through mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity. 43 McHugh argues that the 
Court of Appeal has commenced this transformative process with the Treaty decisions. 44 
He concludes: 45 
The dominant monologic voice of Leviathan is increasingly unable to suppress the difference 
which historically (per Binney's Redemption Songs) and contemporarily refuses to succumb and, 
which, remains teeming with life despite "the empire of uniformity" tending otherwise.  That 
37 R v Secretary of State, ex parte Factortame (No 2) [1991] AC 603.  The House of Lords disapplied an 
Act of Parliament and dealt with this issue of Parliamentary sovereignty by ignoring it. 
38 Above n 35, 522. 
39 McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1991)  ch 2. 
40 Above n 3. 
41 Above n 35, 502. 
42 Above n 35, 524. 
43 Above n 35, 524. 
44 Above n 35, 528. 
45 Above n 35, 528.
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inability will become manifest as Maori continue to negotiate substantial settlements which 
will bring an accompanying growth in economic and political power. 
The jurisprudence underlying McHugh's quest for a gradual transformation from 
traditional to indigenous constitutionalism is based upon revisionist historiography and 
the relationship of law and history.  McHugh rejects the Whig historiography 46 which 
has provided a source of explanation (in addition to law) for Leviathan.  This anti­ 
Whiggism is strongly influenced by McHugh's location at Cambridge University, a 
source of anti­whig scholarship.  He expressly acknowledges his indebtedness to 
"Cambridge men". 47 McHugh's praise of Judith Binney's Redemption Songs 48 as "the 
major landmark of New Zealand historiography" 49 highlights his focus on autochthonous 
anti­Whig historiography. 
This focus on anti­Whig historiography is also evident in some of McHugh's earlier 
work: 50 
The signs are that this organic process [constitutional discourse] is growing in a way in which 
the old Whig beliefs in an absolute, singular sovereign will be challenged. 
McHugh shares with Kelsey the jurisprudential goal of slaying the Leviathan. 
However, this is the limit of their congruence.  McHugh's methodology of gradualism 
from within the orthodox paradigm is rejected by Kelsey as being monocultural and a 
perpetuation of Pakeha hegemony. 51 McHugh retorts: 52 
46 Whig historiography views the development of traditional constitutional theory as "a self­ 
congratulatory tale of pre­ordained growth wherein the past has no option but to produce 
Leviathan's glorious … present":  above n 35, 515. 
47 Above n 35, at n 26:  "The choice of Cambridge has a particular resonance as the influential 
intellectual figures behind this article, Maitland, Wittgenstein, Herbert Butterfield, Michael 
Oakeshott, Professors Quentin Skinner, JGA Pocock, James Tully and Andrew Sharp and (we will 
see) Lord Cooke, PC are all Cambridge men.  This is a moment, perhaps, to acknowledge my 
intellectual gratitude to these figures." 
48 Binney Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki (Bridget Williams Books, Auckland, 
1995). 
49 Above, n 35, 528. 
50 McHugh "The Lawyer's Concept of Sovereignty, the Treaty of Waitangi, and a Legal History of 
New Zealand" in Renwick (ed) Sovereignty and Indigenous Rights: The Treaty of Waitangi in 
International Contexts (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1991) 170, 183. 
51 Above n 2, 98. 
52 Above n 2, 98.
692 (1998) 28 VUWLR 
Such dismissiveness hardly deserves description as a critique, for it absolves its proponents 
from any form of intellectual engagement with the paradigm except through what is usually 
superficial and selective scholarship based on a weak to non­existent historical method tailored 
to reveal the conspiratorial character of Pakeha law and governance.  If you look for 
conspiracies you'll find them. 
McHugh, on the basis of his jurisprudence founded on historiography, attacks the 
"historical stasis" and implicit nihilism of Kelsey's radical commentary: 53 
Unhitched to critical Marxism, the CLS critique would suggest a deconstructed legal system 
permanently adrift.  Tied to the Marxian post, however, the radical critique dismisses most 
change as perpetuation and continued legitimation of Pakeha hegemony and repression of 
Maori Treaty rights. 
Contrary to Kelsey's "passive revolution", McHugh concludes that the Treaty is 
coming to permeate the whole of New Zealand society in a way that is organic and more 
deep­seated than radical writers wish to acknowledge. 54 As noted by Havemann, 55 
McHugh and Kelsey are "talking past each other" at this point.  McHugh argues that 
Treaty justice is possible through the orthodox legal paradigm and Kelsey focuses on 
whether such justice is desirable or acceptable. 
C Jackson 
In contrast to the eurocentric and metropolitan jurisprudence of both Kelsey and 
McHugh, Moana Jackson is committed to reclaiming the institutions, law, religion and 
faith of Maoridom from the oppression of Pakeha law. 56 Jackson utilises the notion of the 
"Word", 57 which is essentially the paradigm of te ao Maori, the Maori dimension. 
Jackson is seeking to reassert the beginning word of Maori, and prevent its 
subjugation to the alien word of the Pakeha world: 58 
53 Above n 2, 104. 
54 Above n 2, 105: "The dismissive view of this change which Kelsey takes is a logical necessity of the 
intellectual hole dug by her own 'radicalism'". 
55 Above n 1, 74. 
56 Jackson "The Treaty and the Word: the Colonisation of Maori Philosophy" in Oddie and Perrett 
(eds) Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society (Oxford University Press, Auckland,1992) 1, 10. 
57 Derived from Harding There is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America (Harecourt Brace 
Jovanovich, New York, 1981), and utilised by critical race scholars. 
58 Above n 56, 1.
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The unacknowledged and denied acts of colonisation flow from the same processes as the 
acknowledged and admitted.  They are all products of a foreign philosophy, a new word 
introduced into our land ­ a word born of a Christian God, a capitalist ethic, a common law, an 
imperial domain, and an individuated manifest destiny.  Above all, this new word is born of a 
cultural and racist arrogance which persists today ­ now more often covert rather than overt, 
more often cloaked in the newspeak of bicultural rhetoric or legal pluralism rather than the 
open bluster of colonialism. 
Jackson argues, somewhat apocalyptically, that colonialism will cease, not when 
Pakeha see the error of their ways (Jackson argues they never will), but when Maori rise 
up to "reclaim the validity of our own institutions". 59 The cause of such a reclamation is 
left unstated, and the effect is abstractly described as "a redemption of the hopes 
expressed so long ago in the first remembered wisdom of our word". 60 
The jurisprudence of Jackson, particularly in the context of his analysis of criminal 
law, 61 is both critical and instrumental in the extreme: 62 
Law is used as an instrument of socio­racial control and oppression. [emphasis added] 
Jackson argues that the structure of New Zealand criminal law is a source of 
oppression for Maori, and a cause of the all too well known statistics. 63 The criminal law 
ignores the Maori perspective on such issues as culpability and harm, and continues to 
dismiss the tenets of traditional Maori law as incompatible with the legal liberal ideology 
of egalitarianism. Through this critique of criminal law, Jackson, in contrast to Kelsey, 
contextualises the critique of legal liberalism. 
Although not acknowledged, his work shares many similarities with Critical Race 
Theory, a recently formed progeny of Critical Legal Studies. The similarities include not 
only the use of the notion of the "Word" 64 and the rejection of legal liberalism, 65 but also 
59 Above n 56, 10. 
60 Above n 56, 10. 
61 Jackson "Criminality and the exclusion of Maori" (1990) 20 VUWLR, Monograph 3, 23. 
62 Above n 61, 24. 
63 New Zealand Official Yearbook (GP Publications, Wellington, 1997): Maori life expectancy is five 
years less than Pakeha;  49% of women inmates and 45% of male prison inmates are Maori;  only 
3.9% of students obtaining bursary are Maori, whereas 36.6% of students leaving High School 
without a qualification are Maori;  Maori make up 65% of admissions to mental health facilities; 
Maori infant mortality is almost double that of Pakeha;  Maori unemployment rates are over triple 
that of Pakeha. 
64 See Lawrence "The Word and the River:  Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle" (1992) 65 Southern 
California L Rev 2231.
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the use of personal narrative 66 and the optimism that change is possible. 67 The 
contribution that these conceptual tools could make to the Treaty discourse will be 
developed in Part V of this paper. 
The language of Jackson's attack on legal liberalism resembles the critical Marxism of 
Kelsey: 68 
Pakeha lawyers, judges and institutions such as the Waitangi Tribunal no longer dismiss the 
concept of rangatiratanga: they simply redefine it as a limited form of property right. 
However, the jurisprudential foundations of Jackson and Kelsey are distinct. Kelsey 
argues the structural inequality of Maori is part of the wider capitalist oppression. In 
contrast, Jackson is seeking to reassert Maori institutions (such as law) in place of the 
current monocultural paradigm. Jackson's writing is imbued with a sense of romantic 
nationalism, he eulogises the social utility of traditional concepts such as utu (revenge), 
muru (plunder) and hara (unacceptable acts). This romantic nationalism is evident in his 
use of the "beginning word", which is strongly reminiscent of the volksgeist of F K Von 
Savigny. 69 To condense Jackson's jurisprudence into that of Kelsey's is to collapse both 
indigenous and eurocentric arguments into the carry­all label of "radical". 
D Brookfield 
The fourth perspective on the Treaty discourse to be considered in this paper is that of 
Professor F M Brookfield, an orthodox voice that probably expresses views held by the 
majority of the profession, if not the Pakeha public at large. 
Brookfield argues that it cannot be contested that the Crown took more than it was 
given under the Treaty of Waitangi. 70 Accordingly, he asserts that in effect the Crown 
65 Hayman & Levitt "The Tales of  White Folk: Doctrine, Narratives and the Reconstruction of Racial 
Reality" (1996) 84 California L Rev 377. 
66 Williams "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights" (1987) 22 Harvard 
Civil Rights ­ Civil Liberties L Rev 401. 
67 Above n 64, 2296. 
68 Above n 56, 9. 
69 Von Savigny argued that a legal system is a subset of culture, and accordingly the origin of law is 
to be found in a people's national spirit (volksgeist). This theory optimistically assumes that 
peoples and nations are unitary entities. Von Savigny utilised this concept of volksgeist to reject 
calls for the codification of the German legal system. See Kantorowicz "Savigny and the Historical 
School of Law" (1937) 53 LQR 326. 
70 Brookfield "The Treaty, the 1840 Revolution and Responsible Government" (1992) 5 Canta L R 59, 
62.
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assumed sovereignty in New Zealand by revolution.  Crown sovereignty was legitimated 
through time and the effective assertion of power.  Brookfield argues that via the 
revolutionary principle what was de facto became de jure. 71 
Brookfield is not proposing the "red neck" conclusions of The Travesty of Waitangi 72 or 
the ultra­conservative position of Guy Chapman. 73 He is seeking to place the Treaty 
discourse into the referential framework of black letter constitutional law. 
The jurisprudence of Brookfield in asserting the revolutionary principle falls clearly 
within the legal liberal orthodoxy.  The rule of law is described as an "unqualified good". 
74 Brookfield's detailed analysis of constitutional case law presupposes that legal 
reasoning is not viewed as merely indeterminate political discourse. Brookfield's 
argument is based on the foundation of Parliament being a unitary and indivisible 
Leviathan.  Clearly, the jurisprudence of Brookfield conflicts with the critical 
jurisprudence of Kelsey and Jackson. 
Brookfield reviews the "legal merits" of Kelsey's work, and her thesis of "passive 
revolution" (not to be confused with the "revolutionary principle" of Brookfield) and 
concludes: 75 
All this is by no means to impugn entirely Ms Kelsey's handling of legal material in the 
writings reviewed.  However, the reader who admires her great skill in dealing with and 
organising masses of facts could wish that ideological concerns and purposes, or perhaps 
sesquicentennial haste to publish, did not at times appear to affect so heavily her treatment and 
exposition of the law. 
This conclusion is another example of the orthodox talking past the radical. 
Brookfield analyses in detail the early Treaty cases without ever addressing the 
ideological issue that concerns Kelsey: what is the role of law in society and in particular 
71 Above n 18, 416. 
72 Scott The Travesty of Waitangi: Towards Anarchy (Campbell Press, Dunedin, 1995). 
73 Chapman "The Treaty of Waitangi ­ Fertile Ground for Judicial (and Academic) Myth Making" 
[1991] NZLJ 228; and reply by McHugh "Constitutional Myths and the Treaty of Waitangi" [1991] 
NZLJ 316. 
74 Above n 18, 415, quoting E P Thompson Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (Peregrine 
Books, London, 1975) 267. Thompson, a marxist historian, acknowledges the mystifying and 
hegemonic function of law, but states that "the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective 
inhibitions on power and the defence of the citizen from powers all­intrusive claims, seems to me 
to be an unqualified human good". See above at 266. 
75 Above n 18, 413.
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what role has law played in denying Maori tino rangatiratanga?  This communication 
divide leads Brookfield to state: 76 
It is necessary in Ms Kelsey's [case] to penetrate beyond the often counter­productive polemic 
of much of her work. 
He ignores the fact that the "counter­productive polemic" is actually the point of 
Kelsey's writing. Kelsey is attempting through her demystification of legal liberalism to 
initiate a counter hegemonic revolution, thus her "counter­productive polemic" is in fact 
the raison d'être of her thesis. This polemic is of course centred around Kelsey's view that 
the relationship between government, law and the interests of Pakeha and capital is not 
linear, but always in the long term interests of Pakeha capital. 77 
E Summary 
This part of the paper has provided a brief overview of four differing perspectives on 
the Treaty discourse and examined the jurisprudence underlying these perspectives.  It is 
clear from this preceding analysis that the work of both Kelsey and Jackson indicates 
some reliance on, and subscription to, what may be generically termed critical 
jurisprudence.  However neither has articulated the critical jurisprudence underpinning 
their work in any meaningful way. In effect, the Treaty discourse has only "scratched the 
surface" of the critical jurisprudential developments of the past two decades. 
It is evident however, that the introduction of such critical jurisprudence is 
vehemently opposed by McHugh and Brookfield, who view such radicalism as throwing 
the legal baby out with the Treaty bath water.  This conflict raises the issue of how a more 
complete autochthonous critical jurisprudence would impact upon the Treaty discourse. 
To answer this question it is necessary to examine in greater detail the fundamental tenets 
and orthodox critique of both Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory. 
III CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
A Critical Legal Studies 
The CLS movement has mounted a full frontal assault on the edifice of modern 
jurisprudence. 78 In order to explore the fundamental tenets and consequential critique 
that comprises this "assault" it is necessary to examine the origins of CLS. 
76 Above n 18, 419. 
77 Above n 11, 68. 
78 Hutchinson and Monahan "Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: the Unfolding Drama of 
American Legal Thought" (1984) 36 Stanford L Rev 199.
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CLS is not a homogeneous and discrete school of jurisprudential thought.  This lack of 
unity is most pronounced when CLS scholars attempt to describe the purpose of CLS. 
Peter Gabel describes the project of CLS as being "to realise the unalienated relatedness 
that is immanent within our alienated situation". 79 Duncan Kennedy (another leading 
CLS scholar) responds that this is "abstract bullshit". 80 Kelman supports Kennedy by 
noting that it is difficult to know whether Gabel is actually describing a blissful state of 
mind or a small household appliance. 81 Accordingly, the most that can be said in 
relation to the purpose of CLS is that it is: 82 
A political location for a group of people on the Left who share the project of supporting and 
extending the domain of the Left in the legal academy. 
This "political location" has however been derived from a mixture of earlier 
intellectual movements, particularly legal realism, law in society and critical Marxism. 
The primary influence in the formation of CLS is legal realism. This influential 
jurisprudential school was developed in America in the 1930s by Karl Llewellyn, Felix 
Cohen and Jerome Frank. Legal realism rejected both formalist attempts to derive 
"correct" legal doctrine from basic principles and "correct" results from legal doctrine.  It 
rejected as vacuous and circular the  traditional legal analysis that was exemplified by the 
writings of Christopher Columbus Langdell 83 and the decisions of the Lochner era of 
Supreme Court of the United States. 84 Such formalism held that judges did not make 
law, but merely applied law that had been created by legislation or that was immanent 
within the common law: 85 
Every judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction. 
79 Above n 30, 1. 
80 Above n 30, 1. 
81 Kelman "Trashing" (1984) 36 Stanford L Rev 293, 343. 
82 Above n 19, 1517. 
83 Langdell "Classification of Rights and Wrongs" (1899) 13 Harvard L Rev 537; Langdell "Mutual 
Promises as Consideration for Each Other" (1900) 14 Harvard L Rev 496; Patterson "Langdell's 
Legacy" (1995) 90 Northwestern University L Rev 196. 
84 The Lochner era was a period at the start of the twentieth century during which the Supreme Court 
regularly struck down social welfare legislation as unconstitutional: See Lochner v New York 198 US 
45 (1905) and Coppage v Kansas 236 US 1 (1915). The case of West Coast Hotel v Parish 300 US 370 
(1937) signalled the end of the Lochner era. 
85 Zane "German Legal Philosophy" (1918) 16 Michigan L Rev 287, 338.
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Legal realism argues that this formalist analysis is the result of manipulation of 
abstract labels and categories. 86 The indeterminacy critique is the bequest of legal realism 
to CLS: 87 
The work of the critical legal scholars can be understood as the maturation of …. Realist 
Methodologies ­ a maturation in which critical scholars explore incoherence at the level of 
social or political theory, and critical scholarship is linked not to reformist policy programmes, 
but to a radical political agenda. 
To the methodologies of legal realism, CLS has added the critical philosophies of 
Antonio Gramsci, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas and Jean­Paul 
Sartre. 88 The consequential "political location" is examined in detail in Part III B of this 
paper. 
It is useful to consider the history of CLS, which commenced in the anti­establishment 
period of post­Vietnam America. The first conference of CLS scholars was held in 
Madison, New York in 1977.  This conference was organised by David Trubek, Duncan 
Kennedy and Mark Tushnet and the invitation stated: 89 
Law is an instrument of social, economic and political domination, both in the sense of 
furthering the concrete interests of the dominators and in legitimating the existing order. 
Personal relationships also played an important role in the formation of CLS. 
Kennedy, Trubek and Tushnet were all at Yale Law School between 1967 and 1972 
(together with other CLS scholars, Abel, Gertner, Heller and Rosenblatt) and Kennedy 
and Morton Horwitz were at Harvard Law School together from 1974 to 1984 (together 
with Klare, Kelman and Stone). 90 These two concentrations of critical scholars have 
provided the intellectual firepower (in addition to Roberto Unger's seminal Knowledge and 
Politics 91 ) necessary to commence the attack on mainstream legal liberalism. 
Twenty years after the first CLS conference, the tenets of CLS have formed the 
foundation of critical feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory.  In addition, the 
movement has expanded from the ivory towers of Yale and Harvard to recolonise 
86 Price "Taking Rights Cynically: A Review of Critical Legal Studies" (1989) 48 C L J 271, 279. 
87 Jabbari "From Criticism to Construction in Modern Critical Theory" (1992) 12 OJLS, 507, 509. 
88 Above n 21, 361. 
89 Schwartz "With Gun and Camera through Darkest CLS­Land" (1984) 36 Stanford L Rev 413, 417. 
90 Above n 89, 415. 
91 Unger Knowledge and Politics (Free Press, New York, 1976).
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continental jurisprudence 92 and inform academic writings throughout the English 
speaking world. 93 
B Fundamental Tenets 
This part of the paper examines the fundamental tenets of the CLS attack on legal 
liberalism: indeterminacy, legitimation and false consciousness.  In addition the 
application of this critique to the legal concept of rights and the CLS alternatives to legal 
liberalism will be considered. 
The indeterminacy critique, the legacy of legal realism, can be summarised as: 94 
Law is simply politics in different garb:  it neither operates in a historical vacuum nor does it 
exist independent of ideological struggles in society. 
This is not to say that CLS is merely flogging the dead horse of Langdellian 
formalism. Most lawyers would acknowledge that such formalism is moribund.  The CLS 
critique refuses to hedge on the indeterminacy of the law, it refuses to accept that there is 
good or bad legal reasoning, 95 it holds there is no interesting difference between legal 
discourse and political or moral discourse. To adapt Clausewitz: 96 
[Law] is the continuation of political discourse by another means. 
Hutchinson and Monahan provide a simple illustration of the indeterminacy critique 
in relation to product liability law. 97 The law chooses between a broad variety of options, 
with one extreme being no liability for manufacturers except for contractual terms, and 
the other being absolute liability for harm caused by products.  Although neither extreme 
92 Above n 87. 
93 Drahos and Parker "The Indeterminacy Paradox in Law" (1991) 21 Western Australian L R 305 
(Australia);  Meyerson "Fundamental Contradictions in Critical Legal Studies" (1991) 11 OJLS 439 
(South Africa);  above n 21 (New Zealand). 
94 Above n 78, 206. 
95 In contrast to the majority of mainstream academic writing which is premised on the rationality of 
the law: For example Stone "Judicial Activism or Judicial Restraint? The Divergence of Opinion 
Between the Privy Council and the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Commercial Cases. Retention 
or Abolition." Unpublished Paper, submitted in partial completion of  LLM, 22 April 1997, at 8: 
"[Decisions] must be predictable if the judiciary are to engender confidence in their legal 
reasoning…." [emphasis added]. 
96 Keegan A History of Warfare (Hutchinson, London, 1993) 3, quoting Clausewitz On War (tr. 
Howard and Panet, Princeton, 1976): "War is a continuation of political discourse [des politischen 
verkehers] by another means". 
97 Above n 78, 210.
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is favoured, the location of product liability law on this spectrum cannot be determined 
objectively by legal logic or policy analysis.  Resolution of the conflict between the 
individual (absence of liability) and the community (absolute liability) is no more than an 
arbitrary choice.  This analysis of product liability law is typical of CLS methodology. 
Through a series of historical and contemporary studies, the CLS scholars have sought to 
demonstrate that the legal process at large and its discrete doctrinal components, such as 
contract, tort, constitutional law, labour, criminal law, and the like, are fundamentally 
indeterminate and manipulable. 98 
Of particular concern to CLS  scholars is the effect of this indeterminacy on legal 
education: 99 
Teachers convince students that legal reasoning exists, and is different from policy analysis, by 
bullying them into accepting as valid in particular cases arguments about legal correctness that 
are circular, question begging, incoherent and so vague as to be meaningless. 
The second fundamental tenet of CLS is to demystify the legitimating effect of legal 
liberalism.  This part of the CLS critique relies on the critical Marxist tools of ideology, 
hegemony and false consciousness: 100 
The legal system (including legal doctrine) buttresses the hegemony of the capitalists by 
propagating a range of everyday ideas about property and contract as well as a range of 
broader notions about individual rights and the rule of law. 
CLS Scholars argue that the ideology of legal liberalism confers on legal doctrine a 
false air of naturalness and results in unjust social structures acquiring the appearance of 
inevitability. For the critical scholars, legal consciousness is a cerebral tool for the 
suppression of time:  it is a device to hide or deny the fundamental truth that everything 
is in a process of changing or becoming. 101 To CLS scholars the current status quo is 
merely a temporary truce in social conflict masquerading as the inevitable outcome of 
such conflict. 
98 Above n 78, 211. 
99 Above n 78, 212: quoting Kennedy "Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy" in Kairys (ed) The 
Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (Pantheon Books, New York 1982) 40, 46. 
100 Above n 86, 289. 
101 Above n 78, 217.
CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 701 
CLS scholars argue that individual rights are the embodiment of this process of 
legitimation and false consciousness.  Individual rights are viewed by CLS scholars as 
"passivising illusions": 102 
People don't realise what they're doing is recasting the real existential feelings that led them to 
become political people into an ideological framework that co­opts them into adopting the very 
consciousness they want to transform. 
Exactly what people don't need is their rights.  What they need are the actual forms of social life 
that have to be created through the building of movements that can overcome illusions about 
the nature of what is political, like the illusion that there is an entity called the state, that 
people possess rights. 
This rejection of rights as enervating is the fundamental distinction between CLS and 
Critical Race Theory, and will be addressed in detail in Part IV. 
As can be seen above, the vast majority of CLS scholarship focuses on the critique of 
legal liberalism through the methodology of deconstruction or "trashing".  Such 
methodology is aimed at exposing illegitimate hierarchies, particularly those within legal 
education. Kelman attacks the hierarchy between professor and student, which he argues 
is illegitimate given the indeterminacy of the law: 103 
Law professors are, in fact, a kiss away from panic at every serious, self­conscious moment in 
which they don't have a bunch of overawed students to kick around. 
A more detailed attack on the hierarchies of legal education is contained in Kennedy's 
infamous article 104 which proposed that all the staff at Harvard Law School regularly 
rotate jobs and receive equal remuneration. The orthodox response that the janitor could 
not teach contract law is dismissed by Kennedy on the basis that contract law (as with all 
law) is wholly indeterminate anyway. Such "trashing" is subject to heavy orthodox 
criticism (detailed in Part III C of this paper), but defended by CLS scholars on the 
grounds that: 105 
One must start by knowing what is going on, by freeing oneself from the mystified delusions 
embedded in our consciousness by the liberal legal view of the world. 
102 Above n 30, 26 and 33. 
103 Above n 81, 322. 
104 Kennedy "Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy" in Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law: A 
Progressive Critique (Pantheon Books, New York, 1982) 40. 
105 Freeman "Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale L J 1229, 1230.
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Essentially the CLS scholars argue that the trashing of legal liberalism is necessary 
before an alternative structuring of human relations can be envisaged. A few CLS 
scholars have, however, attempted to provide an alternative vision of how society should 
be structured. 106 The most comprehensive of these is the "structure of no structure" 
proposed by Unger. 107 
Unger's utopian vision is based on a commitment to ensuring social arrangements are 
continually contested and not permitted to reify into unjust hierarchies as has occurred 
under legal liberalism.  To this end Unger proposes four kinds of rights: 108 
(a) Immunity rights:  which protect individuals from interference and domination; 
(b) Destabilisation rights: which entitle individuals to demand the disruption of 
established institutions; 
(c) Market rights: which replace property rights and give a conditional claim on 
divisions of social capital;  and 
(d) Solidarity rights: which foster mutual reliance, loyalty and communal 
responsibility. 
This "structure of no structure" is designed to prevent the reification of social struggle 
into hierarchies that are then justified by such social constructs as the invisible hand of 
the free market.  Unger is seeking to ensure that there is continual debate over, and 
experimentation with, different forms of social life. 
C Orthodox Response to Critical Legal Studies 
The orthodox response to the jurisprudential attack of CLS has been vigorous, and at 
times vitriolic. 109 The response has focused not only on the conceptual tools of CLS, 
indeterminacy and legitimation, but also on the more fundamental issue of what, if 
anything, does the CLS critique achieve. 
106 See Frug "The City as a Legal Concept" (1980) 93 Harvard L Rev 1059 and Klare "Critical Theory 
and Labour Relations Law" in above n 81, 65. 
107 Unger "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 Harvard L Rev 561. 
108 Above n 107, 599­600. 
109 Above n 89, 455: "CLS is a fountain of confusion".
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Legal liberal scholars dismiss the CLS indeterminacy critique as "almost passé", 110 and 
in any event greatly overstated: 111 
The indeterminacy thesis stakes out an extreme position, and one that is almost trivially easy to 
disprove. 
The response of orthodox scholars centres upon easy cases;  if a man threatens 
someone with a gun and demands money, he has committed armed robbery.  No 
question.  Essentially the orthodox scholars are accepting a degree of indeterminacy in 
the law but contest the absolutist position of CLS, and in the alternative, contest the CLS 
position in relation to the effect of indeterminacy in the law.  McHugh argues that such 
indeterminacy is in fact beneficial as it permits "dynamism and responsiveness" in the 
common law. 112 
The second conceptual tool rejected by the orthodox scholars is that of legitimation or 
false consciousness.  The focus of this response is that CLS imbues the law with a 
persuasive strength that is non­existent, and accordingly ignores other forms of social 
control or legitimation.  At the heart of the orthodox response to the CLS legitimation 
thesis is a rejection of the paternalistic self­estrangement view of human nature implicit 
in such a thesis: 113 
According to this way of thinking, humans are fallen creatures who have become blinded to 
their true situation and have lost their way, and who have consequently created forms of life 
which are frustrating and unsatisfying.  But it holds out the hope that if humans throw off their 
blinders and come to understand their nature and their true needs and capacities they can 
liberate themselves from their shackles, can reconnect to the sources of vitality and health 
available to them, and can refashion their lives so that they are full and happy. 
This world view is rejected by both orthodox and CRT scholars (for different political 
purposes) as naïve 114 and discordant with the reality of oppressed sectors of society: 115 
110 Hasnas "Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or how not to 
miss the point of the indeterminacy argument" (1995) 45 Duke L J 84, 86: "The dispute over the 
indeterminacy argument, and to some extent the Crits themselves, are regarded as passé". 
111 Above n 86, 284. 
112 Above n 2, 99. 
113 Fay Critical Social Science: Liberation and its Limits (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987) 10. 
114 Above n 89, 426. 
115 Above n 86, 291.
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The segregation of buses, trains, and public schools was long required by state law, but that 
plainly did not lead blacks to think it was legitimate. 
The orthodox conclusion is that the CLS scholars have again overplayed their hand, 
law is merely one of many factors that impact upon people's conception of what is 
justice. 
However, the primary orthodox criticism of CLS scholarship is the lack of a positive 
programme to replace the "trashed" ideology of legal liberalism: 116 
If their work is not to be consigned to the dustbin of history, they must seek to translate their 
theories into some attainable dimensions of human experience. 
The CLS rejoinder is that they are under no obligation to offer an alternative to legal 
liberalism. Kelman suggests that the vast majority of mainstream legal academics must 
"have been told (repeatedly) by their moms and dads, 'If you don't have anything nice or 
constructive to say, say nothing at all.'" 117 CLS scholars view it as their legitimate role as 
academics to "trash" and question the dominant hierarchy without a contemporaneous 
responsibility to suggest a replacement.  In New Zealand this role of academics as social 
critics is enshrined in statute.  Section 161 of the Education Act 1989 states the purpose of 
universities is to enhance academic freedom, including the ability "to question and test 
received wisdom, to put forward new ideas and to state controversial or unpopular 
opinions".  Nowhere in the Education Act are academics required to put forward 
alternatives to the objects of their criticism. 
When a positive programme is offered by a CLS scholar, such as Unger's "structure of 
no structure", it is rejected as being so vague as to be "atmospheric". 118 In addition, 
orthodox scholars turn the critical tools of CLS on the CLS positive programmes in order 
to prove that such programmes are no more valid than the debunked legal liberalism that 
CLS is seeking to replace. Any replacement of legal liberalism requires a normative 
justification if it is to avoid merely being another form of ideology. Without such a 
justification any positive programme would be subject to the identical attack that CLS has 
launched against legal liberalism. The "structure of no structure" would, for example, 
replace "legal liberalism" in the critiques. However, critical theory rejects the possibility of 
such normative justifications. In effect any positive CLS programme requires a rejection 
116 Above n 78, 227. 
117 Above n 81, 297. 
118 Above n 86, 292.
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of the basic CLS commitment to the contingent nature of social relations. As Hutchinson 
and Monahan conclude: 119 
CLS is ultimately hoisted by its own critical petard. 
In summary, it is submitted that the force of these orthodox responses is persuasive, 
and the initial attack of CLS has certainly been repulsed. The CLS indeterminacy and 
legitimation theses have, in the author's opinion, been overstated. The latter relies on a 
optimistic view of human nature that is divorced from the experiential reality of those 
people and groups that CLS scholars are claiming to assist. This is not to dismiss the 
critique of legal liberalism, undoubtedly CLS has made an indelible mark on traditional 
jurisprudence.  Critical legal studies has provided the foundation from which critical 
jurisprudence has been able to expand in the 1990s.  It is to one of these critical progeny, 
Critical Race Theory, that this papers now turns. 
IV CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
A Relationship with Critical Legal Studies 
Critical Race Theory ("CRT") is a new form of critical jurisprudence that, along with 
critical feminism, has emerged in the past decade from the shadow of CLS.  The 
development of CRT has been caused primarily by CLS's failure (and at times refusal) to 
develop a positive programme, and the dismissive critique of rights discourse to which 
CLS scholars subscribe. 
The raison d'être of CRT is that, notwithstanding the indeterminacy of rights 
discourse, rights should not be "trashed" as they serve as an essential tool of political 
cohesion and more importantly as a source of self­empowerment. 120 Rights enable 
minorities to rise up from the referential range of  "object" to that of  "subject".  CRT 
scholars are not seeking to totally invalidate the CLS critique of rights, but are seeking to 
strip it of its paternalistic assumptions, and introduce their own subjective experience to 
the critique: 121 
In short, the two groups see rights differently.  White CLS members see rights as oppressive, 
alienating and mystifying.  For minorities, they are invigorating cloaks of safety that unite us in 
a common bond.  Instead of coming to grips with the different function of rights for the two 
119 Above n 78, 233. 
120 Above n 66, 414. 
121 Delgado "The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?" (1987) 
22 Harvard Civil Rights ­ Civil Liberties L Rev 301, 306.
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groups, Crits insist that minorities adopt their viewpoint, labeling disagreement on our part 
false consciousness or a lack of political sophistication. 
This difference in the experimental reality of rights is highlighted by Williams when 
recalling her and Peter Gabel's different approaches to apartment hunting. 122 Gabel on 
finding an apartment handed over $900 in cash to strangers with no lease or keys, relying 
instead on the stranger's word to return at the agreed time. By contrast, although 
Williams was moving into an apartment in a building owned by friends, she signed a 
detailed legalistic lease as an arm's length transactor.  Both Gabel and Williams wished to 
foster a relationship and build trust.  Gabel did this through informality, self consciously 
abandoning his power as a white, male law professor.  Williams recalls that she was 
acutely conscious of her "black femaleness" and sought to overcome this estrangement 
through raising herself to a commercial equal. 
This story is used by Williams to highlight the fundamentally different views of rights 
held by minorities and the white males who make up the bulk of CLS scholars.  CLS 
scholars may well believe that rights are contradictory, indeterminate, reified and 
marginally decisive in social behaviour, 123 but they do so from the position of rights­ 
empowered white male academics.  This rejection of formality is in minorities' experience 
overly sanguine. For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic 
of all of their  previously denied aspects of humanity. 124 
Unlike CLS the project of CRT is redemptive, not deconstructive.  It is in essence a 
movement seeking racial justice in the context of racist America.  This jurisprudential 
attack on  racism is based upon the experience of centuries of oppression, of being objects 
rather than subjects. Accordingly, CRT scholars reject the false consciousness tenet of 
CLS: 125 
Is not "false consciousness" an excuse for white radicals to assert and maintain power they 
would otherwise have to explain and justify. 
This rejection is part of the wider anti­intellectualism of CRT that further separates it 
from CLS.  As noted by one commentator, CRT scholars had hovered around the CLS 
table, never invited to dine lest they use the wrong "intellectual fork". 126 CRT is primarily 
122 Above n 66, 406. 
123 Above n 66, 404: quoting Trubek "Where the Action is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism" 
(1984) 36 Stanford L Rev 575, 578. 
124 Above n 66, 414. 
125 Above n 121, 312. 
126 Dalton "The Clouded Prism" (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights ­ Civil Liberties L Rev 435, 439.
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concerned with the non­intellectual task of ensuring the voice of the silent is heard in the 
legal academy, and is accordingly able to infiltrate the law. CRT scholars are seeking to 
utilise law to create a world in which it is possible to realise the dreams of Martin Luther 
King Jr: 127 
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed…. 
I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves and the sons 
of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood…. 
I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be 
judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. 
These "dreams" provide the heart of the CRT project. In seeking to provide this "voice" 
for minorities whose experience continually reinforces that they are not equal or worthy 
of merit, CRT attacks the cloak of neutrality and inevitability which the law and legal 
education drapes over the concepts of equality and merit. 128 CRT scholars argue that 
merit does not result from the recognition of natural superiority, but from the arbitrary 
ordering of culturally constructed differences, of social, economic and political 
advantages and disadvantages. 129 
CRT scholars also attack the myth of equality which enables the cultural background 
or context in which laws operate to be ignored, 130 thereby reinforcing existing 
hierarchies.  CRT seeks to contextualise and particularise the law from an unashamedly 
subjective perspective in order to transform the racial exclusivity of the law, society and 
legal education. 131 
B Narrative Methodology 
An integral part of the subjective perspective of CRT is the methodology by which the 
concepts of legal liberalism are challenged.  CRT makes extensive and creative use of 
narrative, story­telling and allegory in conveying the message of the Word: 132 
127 Above n 64, 2291 quoting Martin Luther King Jr. 
128 Above n 65, 402. 
129 Above n 65, 403. 
130 Above n 65, 407. 
131 Brown "The Tower of Babel, Bridging the Divide Between Critical Race Theory and Mainstream 
Civil Rights Scholarship" (1995) 105 Yale LJ 513, 516. 
132 Above n 64, 2238.
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The Word is an articulation and validation of our common experience.  It is a vocation of 
struggle against dehumanisation, a practice of raising questions about reasons for oppression, 
an inheritance of passion and hope. 
The seminal example of this creative use of narrative to articulate the Word is 
Williams' explanation of the relationship of CLS and CRT in "The Brass Ring and the 
Deep Blue Sea": 133 
THE BRASS RING AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA 
The Meta­Story 
Once upon a time, there was a society of priests who built a Celestial City whose gates were 
secured by Word­Combination locks.  The priests were masters of the Word, and, within the 
City, ascending levels of power and treasure became accessible to those who could learn 
ascendingly intricate levels of Word Magic.  At the very top level, the priests became gods;  and 
because they then had nothing left to seek, they engaged in games with which to pass the long 
hours of eternity.  In particular, they liked to ride their strong, sure­footed steeds, around and 
around the perimeter of heaven: now jumping word­hurdles, now playing polo with the 
concepts of the moon and of the stars, now reaching up to touch that pinnacle, that fragment, 
that splinter of Refined Understanding which was called Superstanding, the brass ring of their 
merry­go­round. 
In time, some of the priests­turned­gods tired of this sport, denounced it as meaningless.  They 
donned the garb of pilgrims, seekers once more, and passed beyond the gates of the Celestial 
City.  In this recursive passage, they acquired the knowledge of Undoing Words. 
Beyond the walls of the City lay a Deep Blue Sea.  The priests built themselves small boats and 
set sail, determined to explore the uncharted courses, the open vistas of this new and 
undefined domain.  They wandered for many years in this manner, until at last they reached a 
place that was half a circumference away from the Celestial City.  From that point, the City 
appeared as a mere shimmering illusion;  and the priests knew that at last they had reached a 
place which was Beyond the Power of Words.  They let down their anchors, the plumb lines of 
their reality, and experienced godhood once more. 
The Story 
Under the Celestial City, dying mortals call out their rage and suffering, battered by a steady 
rain of sharp hooves whose thundering, sound­drowning path described the wheel of their 
misfortune. 
133 Above n 66, 401.
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At the bottom of the Deep Blue Sea, drowning mortals reached silently and desperately for 
drifting anchors dangling from short chains far, far overhead, which they thought were life­ 
lines meant for them. 
Other examples of narrative include the personal experience of Williams and Gabel 
apartment hunting 134 (referred to in Part IV A), the allegory and counter­stories of 
Delgado's Rodrigo Chronicles, 135 and "agony stories". One such "agony story" is Professor 
Harris's harrowing tale of her grandmother "passing" 136 to enable her to work in a 
department store that prohibited Blacks. Only by this self­denying process of  "passing" 
was she able to ensure her family's survival in the depression. 137 It is this methodology 
that has attracted the majority of orthodox criticism rather than the substance of the CRT 
message. 
CRT scholars argue that story­telling is a unique method for recognising the plural 
truths of lived experience, and for reimagining the possibilities of a more compassionate 
world. 138 Stories accordingly challenge the legal liberal epistemology that truth is 
singular. Williams provides a personal narrative highlighting the plural and partial 
nature of truth: 139 
One summer when I was about six, my family drove to Maine. The highway was very straight 
and hot and shimmered darkly in the sun. My sister and I sat in the back seat of the Studebaker 
and argued about what color the road was. I said black. My sister said purple. After I had 
successfully harangued her into admitting it was indeed black, my father gently pointed out 
that my sister still saw it as purple. I was unimpressed with the relevance of that at the time, 
but with the passage of years, and much more observation, I have come to see overheated 
highways as slightly more purpley than black. 
Although each such narrative is unique, the methodology can typically be 
distinguished by four features: 140 
134 Above n 66, 408. 
135 New York University Press, New York, 1995: A fictional account of a series of conversations 
between Rodrigo Crenshaw, a law graduate and his Professor (Delgado). 
136 Altering her appearance so as to pass as a white woman. 
137 Harris "Whiteness as Property" (1993) 106 Harvard L Rev 1709, 1710. 
138 Above n 65, 399. 
139 Above n 66, 410. 
140 Above n 65, 399.
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(a) Partiality: CRT scholars make no pretence at neutrality, nor are the stories the 
"whole truth" as such a notion is not believed to be accessible; 
(b) Subjectivity: The stories are a celebration of subjectivity, an insistence on the 
importance of voice and perspective; 
(c) Realism:  The stories are real whether they are offered as fact or fantasy, they are 
populated by the richness of human experience; and 
(d) Personal: The stories are personal, and are not about the atomistic individual 
who treads the barren, dehumanised terrain of traditional legal texts. 
The purpose of such methodology is to engage the reader more effectively, to 
encourage connection between the storytellers, the listeners and the subjects of stories. 
The narrative methodology enables the reader, on the basis of the reader's own social 
reality, to formulate an interpretation that is independent of the interpretation of others. 
As noted by one commentator: 141 
[S]tories express depth and complexity.  They allow for ambiguity, multiple interpretation, and 
refracted images.  The reader or listener can be convinced and moved, by intellect and emotion. 
And stories are not exclusive property.  One story invites another as people's words weave the 
tapestry of human connection. [Original emphasis] 
CRT is accordingly able to break through the "esoteric terminology and nearly 
impenetrable style of prose" 142 that afflicts CLS scholarship.  The issue is whether CRT 
has sacrificed doctrinal analysis in its search for its transformative potential. 
C Orthodox Critique 
Unlike CLS, orthodox critique of CRT is sparse and focuses on a critique of the 
narrative methodology as a form of scholarship. Cohen, a black orthodox critic, argues 
that mainstream scholarship has given CRT a wide berth for fear that others will impugn 
the motive of racism to their criticism. 143 Consequently, Cohen argues that CRT has 
become an "academic ghetto in which the quality of intellectual discourse is suspect". 144 
The fact that storytelling is both interesting and effective is not contested.  What is 
contested by mainstream scholars is whether it is a form of doctrinal analysis, and what 
141 Above n 64, 2279, quoting Sara Lawrence Lightfoot "Balm in Gilead: On Love, Justice and the 
Word", speech presented to the Equal Rights Advocates Annual Luncheon (June 15, 1988). 
142 Above n 86, 272. 
143 Cohen "A Different Black Voice in Legal Scholarship" (1992) 37 NYL Sch L Rev 301. 
144 Above n 143, 301.
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standards should be applied in evaluating narrative. Litowitz argues that storytelling is 
merely public comment, and that legal commentators must do more than listen to and 
recount stories.  Stories must be filtered through the framework of legal doctrine. 145 A 
failure by minority scholars to do so could result in the stereotyping of minority law 
professors as specially endowed with storytelling abilities but not with analytical skills. 
Integral to the narrative methodology is the unabashed subjectivity of much of the 
CRT scholarship.  This subjectivity leads to a claim by some CRT scholars that the 
minority victims of hierarchy have a "special voice" and "distinctive insights". 146 
Orthodox scholars reject this distinctiveness thesis: 147 
For a number of minority jurisprudence school authors … personal experience functions like an 
incantation recited to magically endow the writer with special standing rather than as a device 
to make the human impact of a regime more real to the reader. 
This criticism is not aimed at the use of narrative per se, but rather at the quality of its 
use by CRT scholars. 
Cohen does not believe that the use of narrative should excuse CRT scholars from an 
application of the standards of soundness and persuasiveness, 148 standards that Cohen 
argues are often lacking. 149 Litowitz agrees that, in the event of a failure to apply 
qualitative standards to the normative methodology, minority jurisprudence becomes a 
very easy game to play. 150 All that is needed is a personal trait (in his case Jewishness) 
and hurtful experiences. He caustically concludes: 151 
But we must ask where these stories and narratives lead in the law, especially constitutional 
law.  The answer is nowhere. 
Ultimately, the orthodox criticisms are reducible to arguments of merit.  The orthodox 
scholars therefore fail to engage CRT, which has already rejected the notion of merit. 
Accordingly, such criticism does little to affect the CRT project of creatively articulating 
the Word.  The discourse between CRT and orthodox scholars lacks any points of 
145 Litowitz, "Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory" (1997) 72 Notre Dame L Rev 503, 521. 
146 Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations" (1987) 22 Harvard Civil 
Rights ­ Civil Liberties L Rev 323, 326. 
147 Above n 143, 316. 
148 Above n 143, 308. 
149 Above n 143, 322. 
150 Above n 145, 517. 
151 Above n 145, 518.
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common reference and results in both CRT and orthodox scholars preaching to the 
converted. 
A more engaging critique is proposed by Eleanor Brown. 152 She argues that the 
paradigm of racism utilised by CRT scholars is too simplistic for mainstream scholars to 
recognise themselves in the stories told.  She argues that the underlying CRT premise, of 
endemic dominative racism, must be modified so as to incorporate the schizophrenic 
theory of racism proposed by the social science research. 153 This research indicates that, 
although negative stereotyping of minorities is declining, white attitudes on racism 
unconsciously fluctuate between focusing on structural issues (such as living conditions) 
and behavioural issues (such as crime). 154 Only once CRT adopts a more sophisticated 
model of racism will the communication that is necessary for CRT to have transformative 
potential occur. 
V AUTOCHTHONOUS CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
A Critical Legal Studies and the Treaty Discourse 
The final issue is how the conceptual tools of CLS could be applied in the context of 
the Treaty discourse, and whether such application would contribute to the development 
of an autochthonous critical jurisprudence capable of realising a post­colonial New 
Zealand. 
Unlike Kelsey, a "true" CLS critique of the Treaty discourse would seek to deconstruct 
or trash particular "victories" achieved in the past decade, for example, the allocation of 
individual transferable quota to Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) 
Settlement Act 1992.  It is suggested that such a critique would focus on how the 
legislation has legitimised individual property rights and dismissed the community­ 
oriented philosophy of Maori culture. 
A second possible autochthonous CLS critique would highlight the indeterminacy of 
Treaty cases, contrasting the decisions pre­1993 (such as Huakina 155 and Tainui 156 ) with 
the more recent judicial defeats such as the Broadcasting Assets case 157 and the Maori 
152 Above n 131. 
153 Above n 131, 530. 
154 Above n 131, 529. 
155 Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188 (HC). 
156 Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney­General [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
157 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney­General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC).
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Option case. 158 A similar study of indeterminacy could be completed in relation to 
consultation requirements under the Resource Management Act 1991. 159 Such a critique 
would seek to highlight that the legal discourse of the past decade is indistinguishable 
from political discourse. The CLS critique would further argue that the Court of Appeal's 
decisions have propagated a series of notions such as partnership and biculturalism 
which reinforce the illegitimate hierarchy of Pakeha capitalism. 
A related CLS critique would attack the "myth of rights" in relation to Article Two of 
the Treaty of Waitangi.  Such a critique would mirror the critique of civil rights in the 
American context: 160 
Rights are granted to, or bestowed upon, the powerless by the powerful.  They are ultimately 
within the control of those with authority to interpret or rewrite the sacred texts from which 
they derive.  To enjoy them, one must respect the forms and norms laid down by those in 
power.  One must especially avoid excesses in behavior or demands.  Rights are never "owned", 
merely loaned, and all too easily manipulated away or neutralised by the dismissal of their 
potentially transformative promise as fantasy. 
According to such a critique, Treaty rights would be held to be enervating and 
ultimately disutile as they prevent Maori from focusing on the social transformation that 
is necessary to remedy the structural inequalities that have flowed from past Treaty 
breaches. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to fully articulate such critiques but 
merely to highlight the possibility of CLS concepts being applied in such a way. 
The issue is whether application of CLS concepts as outlined above would be 
persuasive and assist in the development of a post­colonialist autochthonous critical 
jurisprudence.  The author suggests that scholarly deconstruction of various aspects of 
the Treaty framework would serve as a strong foundation for critical jurisprudence in 
New Zealand.  To date such "trashing" is absent from academic scholarship in this 
country. Although Kelsey argues the Court of Appeal decisions were not the victories 
they were claimed to be, 161 she does not attempt to deconstruct the decisions or their 
outcomes. 
158 Taiaroa v Minister of Justice [1993] 3 NZLR 421 (CA). 
159 Haddon v Auckland Regional Council [1994] NZRMA 49 (PT); Ngaiwai Trust Board v Whangarei 
District Council [1994] NZRMA 269 (PT); Ngati Kahu v Tauranga District Council A72/94 (PT). 
160 Freeman "Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay" (1988) 
23 Harvard Civil Rights ­ Civil Liberties L Rev 295, 331. 
161 Above n 7, 280.
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However, the author submits that there are various factors that make the 
development of CLS scholarship in regard to the Treaty of Waitangi unlikely, even 
disregarding the issue of limited academic resources. 
CLS is a "political location of the left" and, correspondingly, bases its conceptions of 
oppression and injustice on categorisations of class. However, even Kelsey, who favours 
a neo­marxist reconstruction of society, acknowledges the class war in New Zealand is 
over, the only effective resistance to Rogernomics being from Maori. 162 It is submitted 
that the eurocentric and metropolitan assumptions of CLS are insufficient to explain the 
structural poverty of Maori in a settler society. 
The author further submits that the primary factor militating against the utility of CLS 
analysis in the Treaty context is the CLS critique of rights.  It is not difficult to find 
references to the Treaty of Waitangi being a source of rights. 163 It should be noted 
however, that some would argue the Treaty of Waitangi is merely declarative of Maori 
rights. 164 Any CLS based jurisprudence would apply the critique of the myth of rights to 
Maori claims of rights flowing from Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi. Such a 
critique would paternalistically dismiss the Maori experience of seeking and obtaining 
rights under the Treaty as "false consciousness".  As noted by McHugh, it is difficult to 
see Maori doing anything other than dismissing such an argument as "spurious 
intellectualism". 165 
Regardless of whether they are indeterminate, the notion of rights has enabled Maori 
to argue for the return of the economic base that was removed from them by the Crown 
last century. In a sense the focus on Treaty rights co­opts the ideology of legal liberalism. 
The dominant hierarchy recognises that when such rights are breached there is a moral 
and legal obligation on the perpetrator to compensate the rights holder. In this context 
the focus on the language of contract in recent Treaty discourse 166 is a pragmatic use by 
Maori of the dominant paradigm.  Accordingly, regardless of whether they are 
intellectually flawed, rights have an invaluable practical role in the Treaty discourse.  In 
162 Above n 7, 11. 
163 O'Regan "Readying the canoe on the Beach" in Ihimaera (ed) Kaupapa New Zealand: Vision Aotearoa 
(Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1994) 41, 49: "My concern has been with the basic Treaty 
right …." [emphasis added]. 
164 Mahuta "Tainui, Kingitanga and Raupatu" in Wilson and Yeatman (eds) Justice and Identity: 
Antipodean Practices (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1995) 18. 
165 Above n 2, 102. 
166 Vercoe "A Self­Sufficient Maoridom" in Ihimaera (ed) Kaupapa New Zealand: Vision Aotearoa 
(Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1994) 109, 112: "…[T]here was a contract made at 
Waitangi…."
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addition, as noted by CRT scholars, rights provide a source of hope and solidarity on 
both a collective and personal level. 167 
In summary, the deconstructive tools of CLS may be useful in exposing the inherent 
hierarchies of legal liberalism. The deconstruction of legal concepts, such as the principle 
of partnership developed by the Court of Appeal, would highlight the political nature of 
such concepts and accordingly dispel myths of neutrality and impartiality. However, the 
approach of CLS to the rights experience of oppressed minorities is dependent upon an 
assumption that structural racism is merely another form of social oppression resultant 
from capitalism. CLS has been informed by European and  American scholars and is 
divorced from the perspective of colonised first nation peoples. This eurocentric and 
metropolitan foundation casts doubt on the utility of CLS in the further development of 
an autochthonous critical jurisprudence. 
B Critical Race Theory and the Treaty Discourse 
In contrast to CLS, the author suggests that CRT provides an opportunity to further 
develop our autochthonous critical jurisprudence.  An initial warning should be made 
that CRT was developed in the context of racism towards Black Americans rather than to 
address the problems of first nation's peoples.  Regardless of this history, it is submitted 
the narrative methodology of CRT could contextualise the Treaty debate by espousing the 
subjective experience of Maori with the law. The perspectives of Maori could inform the 
Treaty discourse in a manner consistent with the narrative paradigm of Maori 
communication. The storytelling of CRT avoids the esoteric language and "spurious 
intellectualism" of white male CLS academics. To a limited degree Jackson has begun this 
project by analysing criminal law from a Maori perspective. However, the narrative 
methodology is largely missing from his work. 
Such narrative methodology would enable the critique of legal liberalism and all that 
it portrays as inevitable and natural to be communicated to those who suffer as a 
consequence of this structure.  It is suggested that a CRT analysis of the Treaty cases 
could begin as follows: 168 
What is the role of the word ­ the spoken word, the preached word, the whispered­in­the­night 
word, the written word, the published word ­ in the fight for [rangatiratanga]. 
As noted by McHugh, historiography has already begun this process of 
demystification. Redemption Songs 169 is an example of a richly contextualised 
167 Above n 66, 414. 
168 Above n 64, 2237. 
169 Above n 48.
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historiography which draws on the songs and prophecies of Te Kooti to demystify the 
past. It is submitted that the narrative methodology of CRT may assist the legal academy 
in the process of  developing a jurisprudence which similarly seeks to demystify the 
hierarchies that are perpetuated by legal liberalism. Such a critical jurisprudence would 
acknowledge that the inequalities of legal liberalism are the experiential reality of many 
Maori (and others). 
The challenge for those seeking to mould CRT into an autochthonous critical 
jurisprudence is to avoid the simplistic instrumentalism of Kelsey and Jackson which 
argues that: 170 
Law and the institutions of Pakeha society act in concert as instruments of oppression. 
As noted by Brown in the context of racism, the transformative potential of the 
narrative methodology is lost if the dominant groups fail to recognise themselves in the 
stories told. If narratives are to be persuasively utilised in the Treaty discourse then the 
portrayal of Pakeha motives by radical writers must move beyond what could be labelled 
the colonialist model 171 and replaced with an analysis that incorporates the complex and 
often contradictory views of Pakeha to the Treaty in the 1990s. Middle class New Zealand 
must recognise themselves in the stories, and not be able to dismiss the radical as 
referring to some red­neck that they are not. In addition, as noted by Cohen, storytelling 
for its own sake or as a method to provide the author with standing will only result in 
patronising stereotyping of Maori academics. 
The following is an example of how the narrative methodology could be utilised to 
emphasis Maori subjective experience of the law and its institutions. 172 
"Not a word", Miss Dalrymple hissed. 
The public gallery was packed,  I knew just  about all the people there. All of them stared 
straight ahead, down a narrow funnel of vision, as if afraid to see who was sitting left and 
right.  That suited me fine.  I hunched down, hoping I wouldn't be seen either.  I felt as if I was 
on the wrong side. 
The session that morning seemed to be one where the defendants had already leaded guilty 
and were being processed for sentencing. 
"How do you plead?" 
170 Above n 61, 32. 
171 Whereby the motivations of actions such as Parihaka and laws such as the New Zealand 
Settlements Act 1863 are implied to Pakeha in the 1990s. The events of the New Zealand wars are 
used to assert the current system is merely an extension of previous colonialism. 
172 Ihimaera W Bulibasha ­ King of the Gypsies (Penguin, Auckland, 1994) 187­188.
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"The defendant pleads guilty, Your Honour." 
"Fined £100." 
The judge lifted his gavel, and bang.  A pair of antlers on the wall. 
"How do you plead?" 
"The defendant pleads guilty, Your Honour." 
"Term of imprisonment, one year." 
Bang, the gavel again.  Another pair of antlers. 
"How do you plead?" 
The defendant pleads guilty, Your Honour." 
This time the judge paused and looked gravely down at the defendant.  "Your crime is a 
particularly heinous one in our society, young man.  Assault on another person with intention 
to commit grievous harm must carry with it the maximum penalty available to the law.  Five 
years imprisonment." 
Bang.  More antlers for the wall. 
At each sentencing the defendant bowed his head and nodded as if all this was to be expected. 
His family group did the same.  They were passive in the acceptance of the law and of te rori 
Pakeha.  The Pakeha's place was to be the punisher and the Maori's place to be punished. 
There was a sense of implacability about the process, as if they were always right and we were 
always wrong. 
Why didn't we fight back?  We didn't know how. 
The interpretation of the above story, as with CRT's narrative methodology, is 
dependent upon the perspective of the reader. A reader may chose to focus on the 
Pakeha domination of the the criminal courts, or may focus on how the story highlights 
the inequalities of wealth distribution in New Zealand. Ihimaera is also seeking to 
expand Kelsey's project of demystifying the legitimacy of the judicial process,  thereby 
encouraging the reader to question the neutrality of the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal 
and their continuing role in the denial of tino rangatiratanga. It is this interpretative 
flexibility that enables storytelling to have transformative potential. 
VI CONCLUSION 
As noted earlier, Kelsey, McHugh, Jackson and Brookfield have each contributed 
significantly to development of the Treaty discourse. The jurisprudence underpinning 
both Kelsey's and Jackson's writing could be generically labelled as critical in that they 
seek to demystify the dominant ideology of legal liberalism. However, despite orthodox 
commentary to the contrary, Kelsey is not a CLS scholar. Her writing lacks the 
deconstructive methodology and the critique of rights that characterises CLS scholarship.
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Similarly, although Jackson's work has a cosmetic resemblance to CRT scholarship, the 
narrative methodology and pluralist epistemology is largely absent from his writing. In 
summary neither of the recent jurisprudential developments of CLS or CRT have 
permeated New Zealand jurisprudence in any meaningful way. 
The author submits that, in contrast to the eurocentric and metropolitan assumptions 
of CLS, the subjectivity of CRT and its narrative methodology offer fertile ground for 
realising an autochthonous critical jurisprudence. Unlike the nihilism of CLS, CRT 
provides a redemptive vision of social change that accords with the optimistic nature of 
much of the Treaty discourse. The challenge for the legal academy is to utilise this 
storytelling model in way that communicates to Pakeha who do not recognise themselves 
in Jackson's stories of colonial oppression. If such communication can be achieved then 
an indigenisation of CRT could provide the transformative potential that is, in the 
opinion of the author,  currently lacking in the critical jurisprudence of Kelsey and 
Jackson. However, Unger provides a cautionary note for scholars who contemplate 
accepting this jurisprudential challenge: 173 
One passes all too easily from  remorseless savagery in criticism of the past to childlike 
innocence in the anticipation of the future. 
173 Above n 89, 422, quoting Unger Knowledge and Politics (Free Press, New York, 1975) 284.
